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constitutional authority to accept exclusive jurisdiction,8' it never-
theless does not have to require such as a condition precedent to the
transfer of the lands.82 Thus, it seems that that amount of jurisdiction
which the state is willing to cede to the United States is acceptable, so
long as it is sufficient to prevent substantial interference with the fed-
eral function or operation on the lands in question. Similarly, the
problem appears to be fairly well settled from the state standpoint.
Certainly, the state may reserve powers to itself in its cession statutes or
so qualify its consent that only concurrent jurisdiction is transferred to
the federal government. Perhaps it is not the retention of too much
jurisdiction that might be bad, but rather the states' exercise of that
jurisdiction to such an extent that it goes beyond the limit of not
interfering substantially with the federal operation.
8
But, the jurisdictional problem still obtains from the viewpoint of
persons and property located within one of the federal enclaves. Where
the state concerned has ceded exclusive jurisdiction, property within
the enclave may or may not be subject to state taxation, depending
upon whether the state looks to what was offered the national govern-
ment, what that government accepted, or what restrictions of organic
law remain applicable to the ceded territory.
ROBERT E. STROUD
DOMICILE ABANDONED AS JURISDICTIONAL REQUISITE
FOR DIVORCE
The concept of domicile as a jurisdictional fact for divorce is
under attack again-this time on a new front by the simple device of
a statute which creates jurisdiction to grant a divorce to servicemen on
the basis of residence within the state.' The statute's soundness seems
"Clause 17; Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (193o).
82James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 3o2 U.S. 134 (1937); 54 Stat. 19 (1940), 40 U.S.C.
§ 255 (1952).
8Cf. Committee Report, Pt. I, 14, 20, 21.
"'The plaintiff in action for the dissolution of the bonds of matrimony must
have been an actual resident, in good faith, of the state for one (i) year next
preceding the filing of his or her complaint; ... and Provided further, persons
serving in any military branch of the United States government who have been
continuously stationed in any military base or installation in the state of New
Mexico for such period of one (i) year, shall for the purposes hereof, be deemed
residents in good faith of the state and county where such military base or installa-
tion is located." N.M. Stat. Ann. § 22-7-4 (1953).
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apparent, but, in view of the somewhat confusing situation which ex-
ists in the law of conflicts whenever divorces are granted by a state
which is not the domicile of at least one of the parties, perhaps it
should be examined more closely.
In applying this statute the New Mexico Supreme Court had pre-
viously stopped short of its present position by holding that compliance
with the residence requirements of the statute created a conclusive pre-
sumption of domicile.2 Now the court has met the issue squarely and
in the recent case of Wallace v. Wallace3 has explicitly held that domi-
cile is not the only basis of jurisdiction for divorce proceedings. In the
Wallace case the parties were married in Texas while the husband was
in the service. They resided in Arkansas for two months after the ex-
piration of his enlistment. The husband re-enlisted and the couple
moved to New Mexico in January 1955 upon his transfer to a military
installation there. They purchased a home in New Mexico in Septem-
ber 1955. After marital difficulties arose, the husband instituted a suit
for divorce in Arkansas in February 1956, and one week later the wife
sued for divorce in New Mexico. The parties became reconciled and
agreed to dismiss the suits; however, the husband was awarded a de-
cree of divorce in April. After this development the wife amended her
complaint to ask that the Arkansas decree be set aside because it was
obtained by fraud; the New Mexico court refused to recognize the
Arkansas decree, finding it was obtained by fraud.4 With the husband
contesting all of the New Mexico proceedings, that court granted a di-
vorce to the wife. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed the grant-
ing of this divorce and also the awarding of custody of the children,
none of whom was present in the state.5 The court rejected the hus-
band's contention that it lacked jurisdiction to grant a divorce because
neither he nor his wife was a domiciliary of New Mexico, 6 and held
-Crownover v. Crownover, 58 N.M. 597, 274 P.2d 127 (1954). The court's ap-
proach was criticized in Notes, 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 358 (1955); 27 Rocky Mt. L.
Rev. 353 (1955); and the possible effects questioned in Note, 40 Minn. L. Rev. 77
(1955).
'63 N.M. 414, 320 P.2d 1020 (1958).
'The court reached the correct result in not recognizing the Arkansas decree,
as that decree was obtained by extrinsic fraud. See Levin v. Gladstein, 142 N.C.
482, 55 S.E. 37, (19o6). If the fraud had been intrinsic, a different question might
have been presented. See Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866).
1A discussion of the court's decision as to custody of the children is beyond
the scope of this comment. There seems to be authority for the action taken by
the court. Sampsell v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 32 Cal. 2d 763, 197 P.2d 739
(1948); Stafford v. Stafford, 287 Ky. 8o4, 155 S.W.2d 220 (1941); White v. Shalit, 136
Me. 65, 1 A.2d 765 (1938); Finlay v. Finlay, 24o N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 625 (1925);
Goldsmith v. Salkey, 131 Tex. 139, 112 S.W.2d 165 (1938).
032o P.2d at 1022.
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that this granting of jurisdiction was within the power of the legis-
lature.
It would certainly seem that some court with jurisdiction to settle
their marital troubles should be open to servicemen. Only a few states
explicitly provide a divorce forum for their citizens who have entered
the service and who are stationed in other states3 Under traditional
concepts of domicile it is difficult for a serviceman stationed in a
state other than the one from which he came to acquire a domicile
of choice in the place where he is stationed.8 As a result both the state
from which a serviceman came and the state in which he is stationed
may deny that it has jurisdiction to give him a divorce.
The New Mexico court indicates that the actual basis of jurisdic-
tion for divorce proceedings-putting aside the statute, for the mo-
ment-is a certain relationship, such as extended residence, which gives
the state a substantial, and thereby sufficient, interest in the domestic
relations involved.9 The court comments that the New Mexico statute
gives jurisdiction over marital partners in whom the state has a greater
interest than that of the "divorce mill" states' 0 and, further, that the
New Mexico statute will not create "forum shopping.""
In fact, the theory that there could be no basis of jurisdiction for
divorce other than domicile is expressly rejected.' 2 As the court points
out, "the United States Supreme Court has never held that domicile
of one of the parties is the only jurisdictional basis for divorce."' 3 The
carrousel' 4 of cases from which the court drew this conclusion has at
7Conn. Gen. Stat. § 7334 (1949); Ind. Ann. Stat. § 3-1203 (Supp. 1957); Tex.
Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 4631 (1948); Vt. Stat. § 3214 (1947).
"Mohr v. Mohr, 206 Ark. 1094, 178 S.V.2d 502 (1944); Pendleton v. Pendleton,
1o9 Kan. 600, 201 Pac. 62 (1921) (this case suggests the difficulty in establishing domi-
cile that might be encountered by a career serviceman whose family had been
career servicemen for several generations); Hammerstein v. Hammerstein, 269
S.W.2d 591 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954) (reviewing a long line of Texas decisions).
If something more than mere presence in the state under military orders can
be shown, then some states find residence requirements to be satisfield. Gipson v.
Gipson, 151 Fla. 587, lo So. 2d 82 (1942); Hawkins v. Winstead, 65 Idaho 12, 138
P.2d 972 (1943); St. John v. St. John, 291 Ky. 363, 163 S.W.2d 820 (1942). See Annot.,
21 A.L.R.2d 1163 (1952), and cases cited. The need to provide a suitable forum
for servicemen is discussed by the New Mexico court in Crownover v. Crownover,
58 N.M. 957, 274 P.2d 127, 131 (1954).
9320 P.2d at 1023. Such a suggestion has been made by a writer in this field.
See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 467 (1942).




"See dissenting opinion of Justice Rutledge in Williams v. North Carolina (II),
325 U.S. 226, 244 (1945).
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times indicated that the Supreme Court felt that domicile was the
basis of jurisdiction. 15 More particularly, there is Justice Frankfurter's
somewhat curious statement in Williams v. North Carolina (11)16
that "under our system of law, judicial power to grant a divorce-
Jurisdiction, strictly speaking-is founded on domicile .... The framers
of the Constitution were familiar with this jurisdictional prerequisite,
and since 1789 neither this Court nor any other court in the English-
speaking world has questioned it."'1 There has been valid criticism
of this viewpoint on the ground that the concept of domicile was
unknown at the time of the Constitution.'8
In the tax field the Supreme Court has been reluctant to interfere
in any way with an individual state's determination of domicile for
inheritance tax purposes.19 Although the cases in the field of domestic
'Such would seem to be the obvious interpretation of Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674
(1949); Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945); Esenwein v. Common-
wealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945)-
"325 U.S. 226 (1945).
17d. at 229.
"In a scathing dissent Justice Rutledge stated, "The Constitution does not
mention domicil .... Judges have imported it." Williams v. North Carolina (I1),
325 U.S. 226, 255 (1945) (dissenting opinion). It was pointed out by Judge Hastie
that the idea of domicile for divorce jurisdiction was first enunciated by Story
in 1834 and that the English courts did not adopt it until the case of Le Mesurier
v. Le Mesurier [1895] A.C. 517. Alton v. Alton, 207 F.2d 667, 681 (3 d Cir. 1953)
(dissenting opinion), cert. granted, 347 U.S. 911 (1954), case dismissed as moot, 347
U.S. 61o (1954). The Court of Appeals decision is noted in 11 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
200 (1954). See Cook, Is Haddock v. Haddock Overruled?, i8 Ind. L.J. 165 (1943).
In 1944, English courts were authorized to grant divorces to British wives who mar-
ried non-domiciliaries during the years 1939-195o. Matrimonial Causes (War Mar-
riages) Act, 1944, 7 & 8 Geo. 6, c. 43. However, this jurisdiction, which was granted
on a basis other than domicile, has now been withdrawn. Matrimonial Causes Act,
1950, 14 Geo. 6, c. 25.
It seems that some courts in America prior to Williams (II) had questioned
whether the sole basis of jurisdiction is domicile. Craig v. Craig, 143 Kan. 624, 56
P.2d 465 (1936) (applying a Kansas statute for servicemen which is similar to the New
Mexico statute in the Wallace case). In Gould v. Gould, 235 N.Y. 14, 138 N.E. 490,
494 (1923), the New York Court of Appeals rather casually rejected the argument
that divorce could not be granted without domicile. For a caustic reference to Justice
Frankfurter's statement about "English-speaking courts," see David-Zieseniss v.
Zieseniss, !!o5 Misc. 836, i29 N.Y.S.2d 649, 653 (1954), aff'd, 147 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1955),
noted in 12 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 75 (1955). However, the statement has been accepted
without question by at least one court. Fletcher v. Fletcher, 134 A.2d 59o (D.C.
Munic. App. 1957). For another unusual comparison see the quotation of Justice
Frankfurter at note ig infra.
nAn outstanding example is In re Dorrance's Estate, 3o9 Pa. 151, 163 At.
303 (1932), which found the decedent to be a domiciliary of Pennsylvania. The
finding resulted in a tax of more than ten million dollars. New Jersey sought to
file an original bill against Pennsylvania, but the Supreme Court, without giving its
reasons, denied leave to file the bill. New Jersey v. Pennsylvania, 287 U.S. 580 (1932).
New Jersey then determined that the decedent had been domiciled in New Jersey.
1958]
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relations indicate a similiar disposition to permit each state to decide
the place of a person's domicile for itself,20 there are indications that
the Supreme Court would be receptive to a workable solution to the
problem of jurisdiction which is based upon a concept-as yet unde-
developed-other than domicile.21
In the more usual case domicile provides an easy basis of determin-
ing jurisdiction. However, in a small percentage of cases the forum
is not the place of "matrimonial domicile," and so the decisive juns-
dictional fact is uncertain. A number of methods of dealing with the
problem have been utilized or suggested: (i) the present policy of up-
holding a divorce if there is color of domicile plus jurisdiction over
both partes, 22 and, if the divorce is ex parte, then each subsequent
state that has cause to do so can examine the question of domicile in
the decree-granting state; 23 (2) the method intimated by Judge Hastie,
dissenting in Alton v. Alton,24 under which the court of the forum
would apply the law of the state having the strongest relationship
with the parties; (3) the plan formulated by the Virgin Islands-until
overturned by Granville-Smzth v. Granville-Smith25 as being beyond the
In re Dorrance's Estate, i15 N.J. Eq. 268, 17o At. 6oi (1934), aft'd, Dorrance v.
Martin, 116 N.J.L. 362, 184 Ad. 743 (1936). The estate was then taxed nearly seven-
teen million dollars in New Jersey. The Supreme Court denied certiorari, 298 U.S.
678 (1936). The Court had earlier held that a federal district court had no juris-
diction to enjoin the New Jersey tax officials. Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393 (1935)-
On one occasion the Supreme Court did hear an original bill, but the
fact situation was unusual in that the combined tax claims of the four
states involved and the federal government amounted to more than the forty-
two million dollar estate. Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U.S. 398 (1939). This action
elicited a rather unusual statement from Justice Frankfurter, especially when
compared with his statement in Williams (II), quoted in the text, "[j£]he
necessity of a single headquarters for all legal purposes, particularly for
purposes of taxation, tends to be a less and less useful fiction. In the setting
of modern circumstances, the inflexible doctrine of domicile-one man, one home-
is in danger of becoming a social anachronism." Texas v. Florida, 3o6 U.S. 398, 429
(1939) (dissenting opinion).
-sRice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949); Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S.
226 (1945); Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
4The clearest insight was given by Justice Jackson: "If there is a better
concept than domicile, we have not yet hit upon it. Abandonment of this ancient
doctrine would leave partial vacuums in many branches of the law." May v. An-
derson, 345 U.S. 528, 539 (1953) (dissenting opinion). However, the patience of some
members of the Court with domicile may be nearly exhausted. See the language
of Justice Clark: "The only constitutional bugaboo is a judge-made one, domicile."
Granville-Snuth v. Granville-Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 27 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
nSherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
uSee note 2o supra.
420 7 F.2d 667, 685 (3 d Cir. 1953) (dissenting opinion).
-349 U-s. 1 (1955) (three justices dissenting).
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power conferred by Congress in the Virgin Island's Organic Act-that
the period of required residence was prima facie domicile and if the de-
fendant appears, then the court has jurisdiction without asking for the
"little white lie"26 about intention to remain;27 (4) the method seem-
ingly employed by the New Mexico Supreme Court, allowing a legisla-
ture to create jurisdiction if there is a reasonable relationship between
that state and the parties,28 an approach which apparently extends the
doctrine of International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington29 into the
area of divorce jurisdiction.
The contention that a divorce decree has no internal validity un-
less entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere was rejected by the New
Mexico court because such a decision had never been made by the
Supreme Court.30 In cases where one state has been permitted to ques-
tion the decree, the Supreme Court has repeatedly left unanswered the
question whether the decree is valid in the state which granted it.31
Since the husband contested the New Mexico proceedings, it would
seem that he is effectively precluded from collaterally challenging the
decree.32 However, it may be possible for him to attack the decree
OAs Justice Clark succinctly and somewhat sarcastically put it: "The only vice
of the Virgin Islands' statute, in an uncontested case like this, is that it makes un-
necessary a choice between bigamy and perjury." Granville-Smith v. Granville-
Smith, 349 U.S. 1, 28 (1955) (dissenting opinion).
"The constitutional question that seemed to be presented was not dealt with
by the Supreme Court. From the tenor of both the majority and dissenting opinions
and because of the narrow ground on which the majority struck down the Virgin
Islands' divorce statute, it would seem that an identical statute passed by one of
the forty-eight states might well be upheld by the Supreme Court.
'Wallace v. Wallace, 320 P.2d 1o2o (N.M. 1958).
'326 U.S. 31o (1945).
'432o P.2d at 1023.
11Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226 (1945). See particularly the
language of Justice Rutledge. Id. at 246 (dissenting opinion). See also Rice v. Rice,
336 U.S. 674 (1949); Esenwein v. Commonwealth ex rel. Esenwein, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
The lack of clear authority caused one circuit court to say: "We have searched
the numerous cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United States on the sub-
ject of migratory divorce for a definitive holding as to the judicial status of such
divorce in the state that decreed it. It appears to be assumed that the decree is
valid and binding in the state where it is rendered." Sutton v. Leib, 188 F.2d 766,
768 (7th Cir. 1951), reversed on other grounds without deciding this problem, 342
U.S. 402 (1952). The Court of Appeals decision is noted in 9 Wash. & Lee L. Rev.
61 (1952). Also indicating that the decree is valid in the state which grants it,
regardless of later treatment by a sister state, are statements by Justice Frank-
furter in Williams v. North Carolina (I), 317 U.S. 287, 307 (1942) (concurring opin-
ion); Justice Murphy in Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S. 226, 239 (1945)
(concurring opinion); Justice Black in Williams v. North Carolina (II), 325 U.S.
226, 267 (1945) (dissenting opinion).
ISherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Coe v. Coe, 334 U.S. 378 (1948).
1958]
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directly by appeal to the United States Supreme Court.33 This would
put the issue squarely before the Supreme Court and would necessitate
a decision as to whether there is a basis of jurisdiction other than
domicile. Obviously, if there is, then the New Mexico court had juris-
diction and the decree is valid everywhere. If no appeal is taken, the di-
vorce is seemingly unassailable everywhere.
New Mexico is far from alone in recognizing by statute that juris-
diction for divorce may be conferred in some manner other than by
simple domicile. Kansas has a similar statute3 4 and has reached the
same result, although by less sharply focused decisions35 than those of
New Mexico. Several other states have similar statutes; among them are
Alabama, Kentucky, Oklahoma, and Virginia-which enacted its statute
during the 1958 legislative session.3 6 New York grants jurictiction if the
couple was married within the state,37 and several other states have
statutes to the effect that if adultery occurred in the state, then the
state has jurisdiction whether or not the parties meet the usual resi-
dence requirements.38 However, there seems to be little authority de-
ciding the constitutionality of the statutes. At lease nine states, there-
fore, have created alternate bases of jurisdiction for divorce, and do
not limit jurisdiction to cases where domicile is shown.
It seems that the New Mexico Supreme Court was on firm ground
in deciding as it did. The theory that domicile is the only jurisdictional
basis for divorce should be re-examined and expanded to include
other bases of jurisdiction.3 9 The statute underlying the Wallace de-
cision is quite reasonable in its nature, and firm recognition should be
granted by the courts to such statutes. A nation which has more citi-
zens living in house trailers than in Detroit and a highly mobile popu-
lation would seem to demand more bases of jurisdiction than are found
under the rigid concept of domicile. In several states, none of which
"'At the time of writing, a search of The United States Law Week had not dis-
closed the filing of an appeal by Mr. Wallace. [Ed. note: A letter from counsel in-
dicates there will be no appeal.]
"Kan. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 6o-15o2 (1949).
"Schaeffer v. Schaeffer, 175 Kan. 629, 266 P.2d 282 (1954); Craig v. Craig, 143
Kan. 624, 56 P.2d 464 (1936).
3GAla. Code tit. 7, § 96(1) (1940); Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.035(1) (1955); Okla.
Stat. tit. 12, § 1272 ('95'); Va. Code Ann. § 20-97, as amended Va. Acts. 1958, c. 169.
In the Canal Zone residence seems to be sufficient without permanent domicile,
whether or not a seryiceman is involved. C.Z. Code tit. 3, § 108 (1934).
"N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 1147. David-Zieseniss v. Zieseniss, 205 Misc. 836, 129
N.Y.S.2d 649 (1954), aff'd, 147 N.Y.S.2d 234 (1955).
O$Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 403.035(2) (1955); Md. Ann. Code art. 16, § 30 (1957); Mo.
Rev. Stat. § 452.o5o (1949).
"See Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws 467 (1942).
